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AbsTrAcT
In this paper, we analyze the effect of the retaining bonus on early retirement behavior using a 
unique dataset consisting of a Norwegian employer survey from 2010 combined with register data 
on all older employees in the period 2000–2010. The retaining bonus is one of the most common 
retention measures offered by Norwegian companies to prevent their older workers from retiring 
early. The most common arrangement is a lump sum of between 10,000 and 25,000 Norwegian 
Kroner (between 1100 and 2600 Euros), which was less than the mean monthly pay before 
tax in Norway in 2010. In spite of this modest sum, our analysis shows that retaining bonuses of 
20,000 NOK or more do reduce the probability of 61-year-olds retiring in the next two years of 
employment. 
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INTrodUcTIoN
Reducing early retirement is a goal that features on social policy agendas across Europe, and as people are ‘living longer’, keeping them ‘working longer’ is at the core of the social policy debate (OECD, 2006; Phillipson, 2013). In Norway, as 
in many other European countries, the makers of social policy are acknowledging the 
fact that a significant change in retirement behavior will come from the modification of 
employers’ policies and retention efforts (Vickerstaff et al., 2003). Employers play a key 
role in defining the opportunities for working longer, thus the success of policy aimed 
at delaying retirement depends to a significant degree on the actions and attitudes of 
employers (Henkens & van Dalen, 2012). In spite of the increased awareness of the role 
played by employers, research on the efficacy of retention measures at the company level 
is limited (Hilsen & Midtsundstad, 2015). 
In Norway, one of the most common retention measures used by employers to prevent 
their older workers from making an early exit is the retaining bonus. In 2010, more than 
10% of Norwegian companies (with 10 or more employees) offered their older workers 
such monetary rewards if they continued working past the age of 62 (Midtsundstad & 
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Bogen, 2011). The most common arrangement was a lump sum of between 10,000 and 
25,000 Norwegian Kroner (between 1000 and 2600 Euros), which was less than the 
mean monthly pay before tax in Norway in 20101. Given the relatively low sum offered, 
it is doubtful whether such retaining bonuses can be effective in altering early retirement 
behavior. In addition, research shows that the retirement planning of older male workers 
is more affected by an increase in earnings than the retirement planning of older female 
workers is, suggesting that employer-initiated measures will not necessarily be as effective 
in retaining female workers (Larsen, 2008). Thus, the aim of this paper is to investigate 
whether being offered a retaining bonus has an effect on the probability of opting for 
early retirement, and whether the effect differs by gender. 
There is a substantial strand of research investigating the effect of pension ben-
efits and tax rates on early retirement behavior, and most of these studies show that 
financial incentives have an impact on retirement behavior (Bratsberg et al., 2008; 
Gruber & Wise, 2010). Nevertheless, they also show that the financial reward must be 
of a significant size to alter retirement behavior (Hernæs, 1999; Krueger & Pischke, 
1992). However, these studies investigate the effect of ‘passive’ policies at the national 
level and not ‘active’ measures at the company level (Corsi & Samek, 2010). Thus, 
this paper addresses a gap in the research literature by investigating the effect of an 
‘active’ measure used by employers to retain their older workers. Furthermore, we 
investigate whether the effect of retaining bonuses varies according to gender and 
income group. Our analysis is based on a unique dataset consisting of a Norwegian 
employer survey from 2010 combined with register data on all older employees in the 
period 2000–2010.
PoLIcy coNTeXT
Active aging in Norway and the retaining bonus 
Like many European countries, Norway has adopted a twofold active-aging strategy 
consisting of ‘passive’ labor market policies and ‘active’ measures aimed at retaining 
older workers (Corsi & Samek, 2010). The pension reform, implemented from January 1, 
2011, represents the ‘passive’ part of Norway’s strategy, and early retirement is discour-
aged through introducing actuarial neutrality, by tightening the link between contribu-
tions paid and benefits received by the individual, and by calculating benefits according 
to life expectancy. 
The second part of the Norwegian strategy, emphasizing the use of ‘active’ mea-
sures, was formulated in 2001 at the national level with the signing of the Tripartite 
Agreement on an Inclusive Working Life (the IWL agreement). With the introduction 
of the IWL agreement, the Norwegian government and the social partners called for 
employers to assume greater social responsibility for keeping people in employment 
and preventing older workers from making an early exit (Midtsundstad, 2011). Since 
the introduction of the IWL agreement, the use of retention measures at the company 
level has increased significantly. The two most common retention measures in Norway 
in 2010 were additional leave and phased retirement, making the retaining bonus the 
third most used ‘active’ measure aimed at extending the working lives of older workers 
(Hermansen & Midtsundstad, 2015). 
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The retaining bonus is a monetary reward offered from a given age to all employees 
working in companies with such a measure, in addition to their fixed compensation. 
Thus, the only criteria for being offered such a bonus is that employees continue work-
ing after a certain age; all employees who pass this age threshold are given the bonus. 
The most common age for being entitled to a retaining bonus was 62 years2 in 2010, 
which is the eligible age for withdrawing early retirement benefits (AFP) in Norway. The 
most common level of compensation3 was between 10,000 and 25,000 Norwegian Kro-
ner (between 1100 and 2600 Euros), significantly less than 36,700 Norwegian Kroner 
(about 3800 Euros), the mean monthly pay before tax in 2010. 
The number of companies offering a retaining bonus was quite low prior to 2005, 
with fewer than 2% of companies using this retention measure. However, bonuses 
gained greater popularity from 2005; in 2006, 4% of Norwegian companies with 
10 or more employees offered a retaining bonus, and by 2010, a total of 10% offered 
this measure (Midtsundstad & Bogen, 2011). The fact that a relatively small number 
of Norwegian companies offer a retaining bonus can be explained by the fact that 
Norwegian companies operate within a framework, which offers few incentives for 
retaining older workers. The main exception was the contractual pension (AFP), 
which meant that (until 2011 in the private sector) employers shouldered an exten-
sive share of the cost if one of their employees chose to retire between the ages of 
62 and 67. A study by Hermansen and Midtsundstad (2015) also shows that offer-
ing retaining bonuses was much more common among companies with a contractual 
early retirement scheme in 2010. Thus, they conclude that the financial incentives 
embedded in the contractual pension seem to be of significant importance for the 
retention efforts of Norwegian companies. However, the study shows that offering 
a retaining bonus is not correlated with number of employees, whether the company 
has signed the IWL agreement or not, perceived labor shortages, the time required to 
train new staff, or the proportion of older workers in the company (Hermansen & 
Midtsundstad, 2015).
The labor market in Norway and the contractual pension
The overall labor market situation does undoubtedly affect the employment situation 
for older workers, and it must be underscored that Norway, since the beginning of the 
new millennium, has enjoyed a period of strong economic expansion. Even during peri-
ods of economic downturn for the rest of Europe and strong increases in unemployment 
rates, the expected remaining years in employment for a 50-year-old in Norway has been 
steady or rising. Figures from the National Labor and Welfare Administration (NAV) 
show a strong increase in the expected remaining years in employment for a 50-year-old 
in the period 2001–2014. In 2001, the expected remaining years in employment for a 
50-year-old was on average 9.6 years, whereas in 2010, it was 10.9, increasing further 
still to 11.5 in 2014 (Haga, 2015). Accordingly, Norway has one of the highest employ-
ment rates among 55- to 64-year-olds in Europe and an employment rate above the 
OECD average (OECD, 2013). Furthermore, the Norwegian ‘age-culture’ is, according 
to de Vroom (2004), the ‘extreme’ case in Europe, in the sense of being work-oriented; 
it is based upon a broadly accepted and institutionalized norm that older workers have 
a right and a duty to participate in the labor market. Thus, both a favorable economic 
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situation and work-oriented culture have contributed to an overall high employment 
rate among older workers.
The high employment rate among older employees in Norway can also partly be 
explained by the following five factors (Midtsundstad, 2011). First, compared with other 
European countries, the employment rate among women has been high for many years. 
Second, until 2011, Norway had a relatively high statutory retirement age, 67 years for 
both men and women. Third, the possibility of retiring at the age of 62 was first given 
to Norwegian employees in 1998 through the contractual pension (contractual early 
retirement pension or AFP scheme). Fourth, from 1997, the contractual pension allowed 
individuals to combine part-time work with a partial contractual pension, provided that 
it was approved by their employer, thus making it easier for many older workers to con-
tinue working. Fifth, Norwegian employers cannot terminate the employment contract 
before employees turn 70 (today 72), with some exceptions4 (the Work Environment Act 
§ 15–13). In addition, redundancy regulations in Norway normally follow the ‘last in, 
first out’ principle, making dismissal protection in Norway especially strong for older 
workers with seniority (Svalund et al., 2015).
The contractual pension or contractual early retirement scheme (AFP scheme) offers 
older workers the possibility of opting for early retirement between the ages of 62 and 
66 years of age. From January 1, 2011, the contractual pension was changed to a flexible 
lifelong annuity for private sector workers, making the scheme distinctly different from 
the public sector where it is still designed as an early retirement scheme. Nevertheless, 
this regulatory change was implemented after the timespan investigated in this article. 
Early retirement was available to all public sector workers and about 40% of private 
sector workers (only private sector employees working in companies covered by a col-
lective agreement have an AFP scheme)  (Nergaard, 2009). On average, about 40% of 
those still working at age 61 in the private sector retried on the AFP scheme in the next 
two years of employment during the period 2006–2010  (LO & NHO, 2017).
THeoreTIcAL FrAMeworK
The retirement puzzle 
The early retirement puzzle is complex and being offered a retaining bonus is just one of 
many factors in the work-retirement transition (Wang & Shultz, 2010). As expressed by 
Philipson (2013:148): ‘The complexity of the transition from work to retirement stems 
from being at the heart of the “messy” reality of people’s lives, cutting across individual 
and household characteristics, work contexts, and wider economic and sociological 
forces’. Thus, understanding the retirement transition and the possible role played by 
retaining bonuses in keeping older workers in employment rests on our ability to recog-
nize the variety of factors influencing early retirement practices. In an effort to explain 
this complexity, theoretical traditions within the research literature on early retirement 
behavior present different factors influencing labor supply in the final phase of work-
ing life. The different perceptions of factors used to explain early retirement primarily 
stem from differences in the notion of whether the exit is voluntary or involuntary and 
whether it is mainly affected by labor supply or labor demand (Engelhardt, 2012; Jensen 
& Øverbye, 2013; Midtsundstad, 2012). 
 Nordic journal of working life studies Volume 8  ❚  Number 1  ❚  March 2018 47
The economic theory of retirement
Working on the assumptions that preferences are homogeneous and individuals only 
work to maximize their lifetime earnings, the economic theory of retirement models the 
retirement decision as a strictly financial calculation with consumption as the final aim 
(Engelhardt, 2012; Radl, 2012). Desiring leisure over work, utility-maximizing workers 
select the time they believe is optimal to retire, taking into consideration financial oppor-
tunities and constraints. Thus, the financial incentives embedded in early retirement pen-
sion schemes and other welfare-state programs ‘pull’ older workers out of working life 
(Gruber & Wise, 2010; Hernæs et al., 2002). The opportunities for different action 
alternatives are determined by the accessibility and performance of the various pension 
schemes available, which are decisive when making the choice between work and lei-
sure. Payment levels and corresponding tax rates, age restrictions, and selection criteria 
act as factors ‘pulling’ employees out of working life early. Hence, the labor market 
exit of older workers can be traced back to the financial incentives to retire offered by 
early retirement pension schemes and other welfare-state programs (Engelhardt, 2012; 
Gambetta, 1987; Gruber & Wise, 2010). 
critic of the economic theory of retirement
The economic theory of retirement has long been criticized for modeling the transi-
tion between employment and retirement as a voluntary choice (Engelhardt, 2012). The 
approach neglects the labor demand side, focusing exclusively on the individual decision 
and hence taking a singular labor-supply view. As a modification to the fundamental eco-
nomic principle that ‘if they aren’t paid, people don’t work’ (Gruber & Wise, 2002: 1), 
sociological approaches to early retirement usually assume that there is an intrinsic 
value to work. People do not see work as merely a source of income, but also as a way 
of gaining self-realization, social recognition, and social contacts (Doherty, 2009; Radl, 
2012; Riach & Loretto, 2009). Radl (2012) emphasizes that the intrinsic value of work 
should be reflected in a resistance to leave work prematurely, a hypothesis which is sup-
ported by the frequent occurrence of older workers being ‘pushed’ out of work or into 
involuntary retirement (Calvo et al., 2013; Halvorsen, 1977). 
Evidence indicates that intrinsic factors, such as the meaningfulness of work, auton-
omy, and work enjoyment, may have an even greater influence on retirement decisions 
than extrinsic factors, such as financial incentives (Waginger, 2015). Adding to this 
research, a large meta-analysis conducted by Kooij et al. (2011) shows a significant posi-
tive correlation between intrinsic motivators and age and a negative correlation between 
extrinsic factors and age. 
A social and cultural understanding 
Beyond relating ‘pull factors’ to purely financial incentives and a preference for leisure 
over work, sociological research has also added a more social and cultural understand-
ing of these factors. From a sociological point of view, early retirement schemes repro-
duce the culturally constructed notion of when older workers should leave the labor 
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market (Jensen & Øverbye, 2013). Hence, early retirement schemes underpin an ‘early 
exit’ regime by influencing when older workers believe they are supposed to retire, exert-
ing an independent normative effect, ‘pulling’ older workers out of work early (Esser, 
2005; Jensen & Øverbye, 2013). The existence of internalized age norms concerning 
retirement timing is documented in empirical studies across European countries (Esser, 
2005; Radl, 2012). Such age norms can also ‘push’ older workers out of the workforce 
early, in the sense that culturally constructed age norms make older employees leave the 
labor market early due to social pressure, and not a desire to retire early (Radl, 2012).  
In contrast to the economic research emphasizing free and unconstrained individ-
ual choice, a significant part of the research literature on early retirement has focused 
on involuntary retirement as a result of ‘push factors’. This includes labor market and 
company-level push factors such as structural adjustments, rationalization, increased 
eligibility requirements, and other factors that ‘push’ elderly, less productive, or less 
skilled labor out of the labor market (Midtsundstad 2005; Halvorsen, 1977). Referred 
to as ‘individual push factors’, health problems, as well as physical and mental strains 
related to the job, have proven to increase the likelihood of older workers opting for 
early retirement (Calvo et al., 2013; Engelhardt, 2012; Gørtz, 2012; Midtsundstad 
2005; Larsen, 2004). 
The retaining bonus
As a retention measure, the retaining bonus will mainly reduce the significance of eco-
nomic ‘pull factors’ in the transition between work and retirement, as it changes the 
compensation rate, making work more economically valuable than leisure. However, 
offering a retaining bonus might also send a signal to older workers that they are wanted 
and appreciated. Such signals may help to reduce the significance of the culturally con-
structed beliefs about when older workers should leave the labor market and thus the 
effect of culturally constructed ‘pull’ or ‘push’ factors. This ‘signal effect’ may be as 
important as the financial effect when older workers are weighing the pros and cons 
of continuing working versus leaving the labor market altogether. Analyses explaining 
the factors of early retirement practices that emphasize only ‘pull’ or ‘push’ factors have 
proven to be inadequate (Engelhardt, 2012; Midtsundstad 2005). Both sets of factors 
are relevant, as there may be a variety of factors influencing early retirement behavior. 
Thus, analyses of early retirement behavior benefit from including a model that suf-
ficiently recognizes the variety of factors influencing early retirement practices and as 
comprehensively as possible controls for the complexity of these factors. 
PreVIoUs reseArcH
Previous studies of retaining measures 
According to a newly published international literature review (Hilsen & Midtsundstad, 
2015), few policies and facilitation programs for older workers have been evaluated and 
only a few studies have investigated the effects of retention measures on early retirement 
behavior in Norway. Evaluating the overall effect of being offered retention measures 
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using a difference-in-differences approach, Midtsundstad et al. (2012) found that these 
measures did not help to delay retirement among older workers in Norway in the period 
2005 to 2007. A study by Hermansen (2015) also shows that being offered the possibil-
ity of phased retirement does not reduce the likelihood of 61- and 62-year-olds retiring 
in the next two years of their employment. Meanwhile, another study on the effect of 
additional leave as a retention measure shows that being offered extra days off reduces 
the likelihood of retiring early (Hermansen, 2014). To the extent of our knowledge, no 
studies have investigated the effect of retaining bonuses offered by companies to alter 
early retirement behavior, thus the analysis in this paper is the first of its kind.
Financial incentives – buy-outs, job-performance, and ‘early 
retirement windows’
In the international literature, the use of financial incentives, such as bonuses, is often 
studied in connection with special early retirement programs, referred to as buy-outs, 
aimed at encouraging older workers to opt for early retirement. Using a Swedish regis-
ter-based longitudinal dataset, Hallberg and Eklöf (2010) investigate the effect of buy-
outs on early retirement behavior. The results indicate that the probability of making 
an early exit from working life decreases in the absence of buy-outs, the decrease being 
somewhat larger among men than among women. 
In a US study based on the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), Brown (2002) 
studied the prevalence and effect of so-called ‘Early Retirement Windows’ or ‘Early-out 
Windows’, defined as special financial incentives to retire at a particular time (Brown, 
2002). Using a sample of workers between the ages of 51 and 61 from the HRS in 1992, 
Brown found that those who received window offers were less likely to work in the sub-
sequent wave of the HRS, the effect being largest at the interview following the window 
offer, declining rapidly thereafter (Brown, 2002).
The work-continuation bonus, pension benefits, and tax-rates
Using data from a Dutch longitudinal household panel (the LISS panel) for the period 
2008–2012, da Silva Soca (2013) investigated the effect of a so-called work-continua-
tion bonus (doorwerkbonus) on retirement behavior among older Dutch workers. The 
doorwerkbonus was introduced by the Dutch government in 2009, seeking to delay 
retirement by providing a discount on taxable income from 62 years of age. Applying 
a difference-in-differences approach, da Silva Soca concludes that the reform led to an 
increase in the expected5 retirement age for those workers who were eligible to the door-
werkbonus. However, the study does not shed light on whether the work-continuation 
bonus affected the actual retirement age. 
Larsen (2008) investigates whether a number of quality of work life measures differ 
in importance for male and female workers in their retirement planning, using data from 
a Danish survey merged with longitudinal register data. The results suggest that male 
and female workers are affected differently by various aspects of the job. A substantial 
strand of reseach has also investigated the effect of different sorts of pension benefits 
and tax rates on the retirement behavior of older workers. Most of these studies show 
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that financial incentives have an impact on retirement behavior (Bratsberg et al., 2008; 
Gruber & Wise, 2010). The effect seems to be stronger for those in lower, than for those 
in higher income groups. Nevertheless, they also show that the financial reward must 
be of a significant size to alter retirement behavior (Hernæs, 1999; Krueger & Pischke, 
1992). However, as previously highlighted, these studies investigate the effects of ‘pas-
sive’ policies at the national level and not ‘active’ measures at the company level, such 
as the retaining bonus.
Quality of work, intrinsic, and extrinsic factors
Larsen also found that the retirement plans of both men and women were affected by 
an increase in earnings, however, significantly more so for men than for women. A 10% 
increase in income increased the planned retirement age by half a month among women 
and by four months among men. Such a permanent wage increase is substantially higher 
than the retaining bonuses investigated in this article, and is as such not a retaining 
bonus.
Even though the retaining bonus essentially is just a financial incentive, case stud-
ies show that many older works view such a bonus as a signal that they are wanted 
and appreciated (Midtsundstad & Bogen, 2011). Hence, a bonus offered as part of a 
company’s active aging policy is more than a simple wage increase. Furthermore, stud-
ies shows that the feeling of being wanted and appreciated by the company is in itself 
important for employee’s decision to continuing working beyond retirement age (Jensen, 
2011; Midtsundstad & Bogen, 2011). 
MeTHods 
Data
The data used in this paper covers the period 2000–2010 and comprises all 61-year-old 
employees (N= 12 513) who were employed in one of 437 (from a total sample of 800) 
companies that participated in a 2010 survey. All information on the individual employ-
ees working in these companies has been provided by Statistics Norway (SSB) and is 
drawn from administrative registers.
The sample of 800 companies was representative for all Norwegian companies with 
10 or more employees in 2010 (see Midtsundstad & Bogen, 2011, for an extended 
documentation of the survey). The survey was conducted in the period August to 
September 2010 by Respons Analyse AS, a Norwegian research firm, on behalf of the 
Fafo Institute for Labor and Social Research. The survey provides information on 
company characteristics, and whether a retaining bonus is used as a retention measure, 
and, if so, in which year the retaining bonus was introduced and the amount offered 
(Midtsundstad & Bogen, 2011). 
The survey had a response rate of 50%. In the sample, there was an underrepre-
sentation of small companies (10–19 employees) and companies in wholesale and retail 
trade industry, and an overrepresentation of large companies (250 or more employees) 
and public sector companies. In this analysis, however, we only use data from employees 
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working in companies with a contractual pension (AFP scheme), which included all 
public sector companies, but only half of the private sector companies (of which few are 
small companies and/or within the wholesale and retail trade industry). Furthermore, we 
have only included companies with one or more employee aged 61. This criterion was 
chosen because only employees in companies with an AFP-scheme had the opportunity 
to voluntarily draw an old-age pension at age 62 before the pension reform in 2011. Of 
the 800 companies that participated in the 2010 survey, 437 companies met these two 
criteria – 129 in the public sector and 308 in the private sector. 
Dependent and explanatory variable
The dependent variable is measured as withdrawal of a contractual pension in the 
next two years of employment, among workers still working at age 61 in the period 
2000–2008. Thus, the dependent variable is measured in the period 2001–2010. 
Employees aged 61 and withdrawing early retirement benefits in the next two years of 
employment are given the value ‘1’ upon withdrawal, whereas those who do not retire 
are given the value ‘0’ on the dependent variable.  
The retaining bonus is measured as a dummy variable; those who are not offered a 
bonus are given the value ‘0’, whereas those 61-year-olds who are offered the bonus are 
given the value ‘1’ when they turn 62. Thus, for those who are not offered a retaining 
bonus, the dummy variable is ‘0’ at the ages of 61, 62, and 63, whereas for those who 
are offered a bonus, the variable is ‘0’ at age 61 and ‘1’ at ages 62 and 63.   
Model - Individual fixed effects 
In order to investigate the effect of the retaining bonus on early retirement behavior, we 
use the panel data method, individual fixed effects in combination with a linear prob-
ability model. The advantage of using individual fixed effects is that this model controls 
for all time-independent unobservable heterogeneity that could be correlated with the 
main independent variable and thereby produces an over- or underestimated coefficient. 
An individual fixed-effects model uses only variation within the same unit (individual) 
over time and therefore produces robust estimates on the effects of changes in different 
independent variables on different outcomes, controlling for all time-invariant explana-
tory variables and time-independent unobservable heterogeneity (Angrist & Pischke, 
2008; Wooldridge, 2005, 2009). Estimating the effect of the retaining bonus using indi-
vidual fixed effects and a linear probability model can be written as follows (Angrist & 
Pischke, 2008): 
yit = αi + λi + βxit + β2TREATit + β3AGE62i + β4AGE63i + εit 
where, i = 1 … n, t = 1, …, Ti
In the analysis, we investigate whether 61-year-olds working in companies offering a 
retaining bonus at age 62 (β2BONUSit) have a lower probability of retiring early (yit) 
in the next two years of employment. β2BONUSit equals ‘1’ if the individual is offered 
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a bonus at age 62, and is still ‘1’ for these individuals at age 63. β3AGE62i provides an 
estimate of the overall probability of retiring at age 62 for all included individuals and 
β4AGE63i  provides an estimate of the overall probability of retiring at age 63.
A company is identified as offering a retaining bonus on the basis of the HR 
manager/executive director of the company in August–September of 2010 having 
reported to have made this measure available to older workers with the purpose of 
encouraging them to continue working. Among the companies having introduced a 
retaining bonus, only those with an entitlement age set at 62 years are included in the 
analysis. Offering a retaining bonus is a choice made by each individual company and 
hence the group of Norwegian companies offering this retention measure is self-selected. 
However, the distribution of older workers in the intervention group and the control 
group can be assumed to be random, given that very few employees change jobs after the 
age of 60, enabling them to actively seek out companies with such retention measures 
for older workers (Lien, 2013; OECD, 2013). Furthermore, any time-invariant differ-
ences between workers being offered the retaining bonus and those not receiving such an 
offer is controlled for when using individual fixed effects. In addition to controlling for 
any time-invariant differences, we include time-variant controls in our analysis, guided 
by previous research.
Control variables
As previously mentioned, the advantage of using individual fixed effects is that these 
models control for all time-invariant explanatory variables and time-independent unob-
servable heterogeneity (Angrist & Pischke, 2008; Wooldridge, 2005, 2009). Thus, despite 
not being listed in the tables reporting the results, we control for all time-invariant 
risk factors. Given that these factors are fixed and do not vary within the individual 
over time, the individual fixed-effects model does not estimate a covariate showing their 
effect on the outcome of interest (Angrist & Pischke 2008; Wooldridge, 2005, 2009).
To account for the effect of time-varying financial incentives that might influence 
employees’ probability of drawing an early retirement pension, ‘income percentile’ (net 
income after tax divided into percentiles); ‘spouse income percentile’ (spouse income 
after tax divided into percentiles) and ‘household debts percentile’ (household debts 
divided into percentiles) are included in the analysis. 
Research on the relationship between marital status and economic activity shows 
that many couples ‘coordinate’ their retirement. The tendency for couples to make a 
joint exit from working life is known as ‘the joint retirement hypothesis’ (Lancee & 
Radl, 2012). To control for the possibility that couples ‘coordinate’ their retirement, the 
analysis includes ‘spouse retired on the contractual pension’ and ‘spouse retired on dis-
ability pension’.
We present descriptive statistics for the control variables and a selection of key 
information for the group of 61-year-olds being offered a retaining bonus and the 
61-year-olds not being offered this retention measure in Table 1.
As summarized in Table 1, the group of 61-year-olds being offered a retaining bonus 
consists of a somewhat higher share of women and the mean income percentile of this 
group is somewhat lower than for the group not being offered a retaining bonus. The 
descriptive statistics also show that the share working full-time 30 hours or more is 
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Table 1  Descriptive statistics – control variables and a selection of key information for the group 





Elementary school 19.18 20.02
High school 45.67 43.59
Undergraduate from university/college 28.43 26.94
Postgraduate from university/college 6.72 9.45
Income percentile, mean (s.d.) 43.93 (28) 50.72 (29)
Spouse income percentile, mean (s.d.) 46.47 (31) 44.82 (31)
Household debts percentile, mean (s.d.) 37.96 (29) 42.10 (29)
Spouse retired on AFP
retirement scheme 
8.05 6.29
Spouse retired on disability pension 15.55 15.62
Full-time 30 hours or more 62.5 72.9
Part-time 20–29 hours 19.1 14.9
Part-time <20 hours 18.4 12.2
Worker 63.9 41.5
Routine nonmanual employee 17.6 32.8
Professional, administrator, or official 18.5 25.7
Public administration 12.7 9.4
Other industries 5.1 15.4
Teaching 31.1 27.2
Health and social services 34.1 26.0
Manufacturing 8.3 9.7
Construction 3.1 3.1
Hotels and restaurants 0.04 3.9
Wholesale and retail trade 5.6 5.3
N 2680 9833
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somewhat lower for the group of 61-year-olds being offered a retaining bonus, whereas 
the distribution according to occupational class shows that the share of workers is some-
what higher. Among the 61-year-olds being offered a bonus, there is also a somewhat 
higher share of employees who work in public administration, teaching, and health and 
social services.  
resULTs
All analyses were performed using Stata, version 12, and all models presented in the four 
tables have been estimated using individual fixed effects and linear probability models. 
We present the results for all bonuses and bonuses of 20,000 NOK or more in Table 2. 
As summarized in the table, the overall probability of a 61-year-old withdrawing a con-
tractual pension is 22% when turning 62 and 31% when turning 63. When looking at 
the results for all bonuses, 61-year-olds being offered a bonus at age 62 do not have a 
lower probability of retiring in the next two years of employment. This result does not 
change when including the control variables in model 2.
However, when investigating the effect of bonuses with an offered amount of 20,000 
NOK or more, 61-year-olds being offered the retaining bonus have a 5.7% lower overall 
probability of retiring in the next two years of employment. The results also show that 
the probability of retiring early on the contractual pension is reduced with an increase 
in income percentile and spouse income percentile. Furthermore, having a spouse who 
Table 2  Individual probability of withdrawing a contractual pension among 61-year-olds in the next 
two years of employment, having been exposed to bonus as a retention measure from 











Retention measure – bonus –0.023 –0.018 –0.065*** –0.057***
Age 62 0.221*** 0.216*** 0.220*** 0.215***
Age 63 0.335*** 0.307*** 0.334*** 0.307***
Income percentile –0.005*** –0.005***
Spouse income percentile –0.001*** –0.001***
Household debts percentile –0.000 –0.000
Spouse retired on contractual pension 0.110*** 0.111***
Spouse retired on disability pension 0.021 0.018
R² within-group 0.254 0.285 0.259 0.282
Number of observations   35,946    35,946   34,626   34,626
Number of groups   12,513    12,513   12,513   12,513
**: p ≤ 0.05, ***: p ≤ 0.01 
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retires on the contractual pension significantly increases the probability of retiring early 
in the next two years of employment.  
The results are divided according to gender in Table 3. The results show that nei-
ther women nor men being offered a retaining bonus, irrespective of the amount being 
offered, have a lower probability of retiring early. However, women being offered a 
bonus of 20,000 NOK or more have on average a 3.6% lower probability of retiring 
early, whereas the effect for men is 12.2%.
To further investigate the importance of the amount being offered, we have per-
formed the analysis according to income group, dividing between the lowest third, the 
mid third, and the top third of the income distribution at age 61. Tables 4 and 5 present 
the results divided by gender, income group, and the amount being offered. 
As summarized in Table 4, only women in the lowest third of the income distribu-
tion at age 61 have a significantly lower probability of retiring in the next two years 
of employment, on average 5.3%, when offered a bonus of 20,000 NOK or more. The 
result for men is quite the opposite, as summarized in Table 5, only men in the top third 
of the income distribution at age 61 have a significantly lower probability of retiring in 
the next two years of employment when being offered a retaining bonus. 
Men in the top third of the income distribution being offered a retaining bonus, 
irrespective of the amount being offered, have on average a 5.9% lower probability of 
retiring in the next two years of employment. Furthermore, those being offered a bonus 
of 20,000 NOK or more have on average a 14.6% lower probability of retiring early at 
the ages of 62 or 63. 
Table 3  Individual probability of withdrawing a contractual pension among 61-year-old women and 
men in the next two years of employment, having been exposed to bonus as a retention 






Bonus ≥ 20,000 
NOK
Men
Bonus ≥ 20,000 
NOK
Retention measure – bonus –0.015 –0.022 –0.036** –0.122***
Age 62 0.207*** 0.228*** 0.205*** 0.228***
Age 63 0.302*** 0.311*** 0.303*** 0.310***
Income percentile –0.006*** –0.005*** –0.005*** –0.005***
Spouse income percentile –0.001*** 0.000 –0.001*** 0.000
Household debts percentile –0.000 0.000 –0.000 0.000
Spouse retired on contractual pension 0.086*** 0.182*** 0.086*** 0.191***
Spouse retired on disability pension 0.002 0.057 –0.001 0.055
R² within-group 0.279 0.297 0.276 0.296
Number of observations 22,396 13,542 21,610 13,008
Number of groups   7785 4728 7785 4728
**: p ≤ 0.05, ***: p ≤ 0.01
56 The Effect of Retaining Bonuses  Åsmund Hermansen et al.
Table 4  Individual probability of withdrawing a contractual pension among 61-year-old women in 
the next two years of employment, having been exposed to bonus as a retention mea-
sure, according to income at age 61, all amounts and 20,000 NOK or more 
Women
The lowest third of the 
income distribution at 
age 61
Women
The mid third of the 
income distribution at 
age 61
Women
The top third of the 


















measure – bonus 
–0.033 –0.053** –0.012 –0.045 –0.000 0.001
Age 62 0.234*** 0.230*** 0.201*** 0.200*** 0.157*** 0.155***
Age 63 0.336*** 0.335*** 0.289*** 0.291*** 0.237*** 0.242***
Income percentile –0.005*** –0.005*** –0.008*** –0.007*** –0.006*** –0.006***
Spouse income 
percentile
–0.001*** –0.001** –0.002*** –0.002*** –.000 –.000
Household debts 
percentile




0.089*** 0.087*** 0.068*** 0.070*** 0.102** 0.098**
Spouse retired on 
disability pension
0.012 0.008 0.008 0.014 –0.030 –0.062
R² within-group 0.275 0.272 0.303 0.299 0.269 0.268
Number of obser-
vations
  10,331   9980   7525    7235    4540    4395
Number of groups  3527   3527   2616   2616   1576   1576
**: p ≤ 0.05, ***: p ≤ 0.01
Table 5  Individual probability of withdrawing a contractual pension among 61-year-old men in the 
next two years of employment, having been exposed to bonus as a retention measure, 
according to income at age 61, all amounts and 20,000 NOK or more
Men
The lowest third of the 
income distribution at 
age 61
Men
The mid third of the 
income distribution at 
age 61
Men
The top third of the 















measure – bonus 
–0.043 –0.113 0.049 –0.069 –0.059** –0.146***
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Men
The lowest third of the 
income distribution at 
age 61
Men
The mid third of the 
income distribution at 
age 61
Men
The top third of the 














Age 62 0.231*** 0.222*** 0.281*** 0.282*** 0.186*** 0.188***
Age 63 0.318*** 0.312*** 0.362*** 0.366*** 0.260*** 0.258***
Income per-
centile
–0.002*** –0.002*** –0.005*** –0.005*** –0.006*** –0.006***
Spouse income 
percentile
0.003 0.004** –0.000 –0.002 0.000 0.000
Household debts 
percentile








0.012 0.010 0.116** 0.137*** 0.009 –0.010
R² within-group 0.250 0.247 0.350 0.347 0.289 0.289
Number of 
observations
   1608   1540    4511    4330    7423    7138
Number of 
groups 
    567    567    1580    1580    2584    2584
**: p ≤ 0.05, ***: p ≤ 0.01
dIscUssIoN 
This paper revisits a long-debated subject in early retirement research, namely the 
importance of financial incentives in the transition between work and retirement. Finan-
cial considerations and constraints do undoubtedly affect the opportunity structure of 
older workers in the transition between work and retirement and there is, as previously 
highlighted, a substantial strand of research showing that financial incentives have a 
significant impact on retirement behavior (Bratsberg et al., 2008;  Gruber & Wise, 2010; 
Radl, 2012). However, research also indicates that the financial reward must be of a 
significant size to alter an early-exit decision (Hernæs, 1999; Krueger & Pischke, 1992). 
Unlike these previous studies investigating the effect of ‘passive’ policies at the national 
level, our analysis is based on investigating the effects of an ‘active’ measure at the com-
pany level – offering a modest lump sum of money to prevent older workers from making 
an early exit. To our knowledge, this is the first study investigating the effect of retain-
ing bonuses on early retirement behavior. Thus, we address a gap in the literature on the 
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significance of financial incentives for early retirement behavior. Our results show that a 
retaining bonus of 20,000 NOK or more (equal to 54% of a mean monthly income in 
2010) does reduce the probability of retiring early; however, it should be emphasized that 
the mean reduction is only 5.7%.
Inspired by Larsen (2008), we went further than investigating the overall effect of 
the retaining bonus, performing separate analyses for women and men. As previously 
mentioned, Larsen found that the retirement plans of male workers are more affected 
by an increase in earnings than those of female workers, suggesting that employer- 
initiated efforts to retain older workers will not necessarily be as effective for female 
as for male workers. Our analysis supports this hypothesis, when separating between 
men and women, our results show that women being offered a bonus of 20,000 NOK 
or more have on average 3.6% lower probability of retiring early, whereas the effect 
for men was 12.2%. These results suggest that the retaining bonus is a more effective 
measure when targeting men than when targeting women. 
The retaining bonus, investigated in this paper, is essentially a purely financial 
incentive, as it does not involve any adaptation of the work situation or strengthening 
of employees’ work ability (Hermansen & Midtsundstad, 2015). Thus, as previously 
argued, the retaining bonus will mainly reduce the significance of economic ‘pull factors’ 
in the transition between work and retirement, as it changes the compensation rate, 
making work more economically valuable than leisure. Nevertheless, being offered a 
retaining bonus arguably also sends a signal to older workers that they are wanted and 
appreciated by the company, irrespective of the pure financial value it may represent for 
the employees. Such signals may help to reduce the significance of culturally constructed 
beliefs about when older workers should leave the labor market. 
This ‘signal effect’ embedded in the retaining bonus may be as important for older 
employees as the financial effect of the bonus when they are weighing the pros and cons of 
continuing working versus leaving the labor market altogether. However, analysis based on 
register data provides at best only indirect insight into the complexity of desires, believes, 
and opportunities faced by older workers in the transition between work and retirement. 
Thus, given the data we use in our analyses, we are unable to distinguish between the rela-
tive significance of these two factors. Nevertheless, the financial incentive embedded in the 
retaining bonus will arguably be greater for those in the lower income groups, given that 
the sum offered will constitute a larger percentage of income for lower income groups 
than for higher income groups. Thus, one might argue that for those with low income, the 
retaining bonus may both act as a signal and as a financial incentive, whereas for those with 
higher wages, the bonus primarily acts as signal, given the low sum being offered. 
To further investigate the significance of retaining bonuses in the transition between 
work and retirement, we performed separate analysis according to income group, separat-
ing between women and men and according to the amount being offered. The results show 
that for women, only those in the lowest third of the income distribution at age 61 have a 
lower probability of retiring early when being offered a bonus of 20,000 NOK or more. For 
men, by contrast, only those in the highest third of the income distribution at age 61 have a 
lower probability of retiring early. The results show that men with the highest earnings have 
on average 5.9% lower probability of retiring early when being offered a bonus, irrespec-
tive of the sum being offered. When delimiting the analysis to retaining bonuses of 20,000 
NOK or more, men with the highest earnings being offered this measure have on average 
14.6% lower probability of making an early exit in the next two years of employment. 
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Given these results, it seems reasonable to assume that older women in the lowest 
income group are retained primarily by the financial incentive embedded in the retain-
ing bonus. This argument is supported by the fact that we find no effect of the bonus 
when investigating all bonuses, irrespective of the amount being offered. The results 
show that only bonuses of 20,000 NOK or more have an effect on the early retirement 
probability for older women with the lowest earnings. Whereas, for older men in the 
highest third of the income distribution, the results indicate that both the ‘signal effect’ 
and the financial incentive embedded in the retaining bonus might be of importance 
when they are weighing the pros and cons of continuing working versus leaving the 
labor market altogether. 
Radl (2013) underscores that the opportunity structure of older workers is to a 
significant degree shaped by their health and financial situation. Radl argues that only 
those who are healthy and have a job, or the chance of getting one, can opt for contin-
ued work, and only those who have accumulated the necessary pension entitlements 
or who hold significant assets can afford to retire early. Given these facts, we must 
emphasize that the data used in our analyses consisted exclusively of older employees 
who were all working at the age of 61. These employees can be assumed to be healthier 
than the population of older employees as a whole, since a large proportion of Nor-
wegian employees leave the labor market on the disability pension before they turn 60 
(Midtsundstad et al., 2012). Thus, our results cannot be generalized outside the age 
group investigated in this paper and we cannot rule out the possibility that the effect 
of the retaining bonus presupposes a target group which constitutes a relatively healthy 
group of older workers.
Furthermore, the financial situation is undoubtedly a key element in the opportunity 
structure facing older workers and financial constraints vary significantly between dif-
ferent income groups (Radl, 2012). Moreover, it seems reasonable to assume that older 
male workers in the top third of the income distribution have accumulated the necessary 
pension entitlements and have the assets making early retirement an affordable option. 
Thus, this group of older workers may have a desire to keep on working, they believe 
they are able to keep up and their health provides them with the opportunity to do so; 
being offered a bonus may just be the triggering mechanism for them to stay on. 
For older women in the lowest third of the income distribution, however, early 
retirement may be desirable, especially if they have health problems, but low pension 
entitlements and a lack of assets, due to shorter careers and more part time work, may 
force them to continue working. Men in the lowest third of the income distribution 
will, on the other hand, due to longer careers and full time work, to a larger degree 
have accumulated the necessary pension entitlement to follow they desire to retire, if 
they have health problems. In other words, the effect of the retaining bonus may not 
only be conditioned by level of income but also by the employee’s pension entitlements 
and assets.
For older men in the top third of the income distribution, the retaining bonus not 
only marginally increases the benefits of continuing working but also motivates them 
to keep on working for a few more years. For women in the lowest third of the income 
distribution, on the other hand, low pension entitlements, a lack of assets, and being 
offered a retaining bonus of 20,000 NOK or more makes continuing working a financial 
necessity, rather than a motivated choice. 
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coNcLUsIoN
In this paper, we have analyzed the effect of the retaining bonus on early retirement 
behavior using a unique dataset consisting of a Norwegian employer survey from 2010 
combined with register data on all older employees in the period 2000–2010. In spite of 
the relatively low sum being offered to prevent older workers from making an early exit, 
our analysis shows that retaining bonuses of 20,000 NOK or more (equal to 54% of a 
mean monthly income in 2010) do reduce the probability of 61-year-olds retiring in the 
next two years of employment. However, it needs to be emphasized that the probability 
of 61-year-olds retiring in the next two years is only reduced with 5.7% on mean. This 
just illustrates the fact that the early retirement puzzle is complex and being offered a 
retaining bonus is just one of many factors in the work-retirement transition.
When separating according to income group, our results indicate that both the 
financial incentive and the ‘signal effect’ embedded in the retaining bonus affect the 
retirement decision of older men in the top third of the income distribution. For women 
on the other hand, the effect of the retaining bonus for those in the lowest third of the 
income distribution seems to derive from the increased financial gains of working a few 
more years. 
As previously mentioned, register data provide at best only indirect insight into 
the desires, believes, and opportunities facing older workers. Thus, we are unable to 
fully grasp this complexity in the present study, and interpretation of the results must 
inevitably be based on assumptions and indirect evidence. Nevertheless, older workers 
still working at the age of 61 is arguably a select group of employees. Therefore, the 
results presented in this paper only provide insight into the effect of one single mea-
sure used to retain older workers, in a defined period of time, and for a select group 
of employees. 
One can also question, as Midtsundstad and Bogen (2011) have, whether the use 
of standardized retention measures or a one-size-fits-all approach, such as offering a 
retaining bonus, is the most appropriate way to retain older workers given the heteroge-
neity of needs, problems, and challenges facing different industries and groups of older 
employees. Furthermore, employees are only eligible for these measures at the age of 62, 
which in many sectors and industries is too high to make a difference for individuals 
at the risk of becoming disabled. As Midtsundstad and Bogen (2011) argue, retaining 
efforts, including bonuses, may prove to be more effective if targeted according to the 
heterogeneity of needs, problems, and challenges facing different industries and groups 
of employees. 
As an alternative to the emphasis on incentives, Midtsundstad (2015) argues for the 
importance of a broader approach to active aging in Norway, in which the prevention 
of health problems and reduced work capacity is more emphasized. A broader focus 
to active aging will potentially enhance the opportunity structure of the less healthy 
and work-able older workers. Along similar lines, Larsen (2008) argues for improving 
older workers’ quality of work as a strategy for reversing the tendency toward early 
withdrawal from the labor market. Reducing health impairment, by improving work-
ing conditions and focusing on early prevention, may not only provide older workers 
with the opportunity to continue working, but also be an incentive to continue working 
by enhancing the desire to work longer and the belief in one’s ability to do so (Larsen, 
2008; Midtsundstad, 2015). Instead of offering a retaining bonus, which is essentially 
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just an incentive, not affecting the work situation or work ability of older workers, one 
might argue, as Paullin and Whetzel (2012) have, that the easiest and least costly reten-
tion strategy may be just to simply ask healthy and work-able older workers to continue 
working and strive to make them feel valued.
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Notes
1   According to Statistics Norway, the mean monthly pay before tax in 2010 was 36,700 
Norwegian Kroner.
2   This entitlement age applied to 92 (8%) of the 61-year-olds working in companies offering 
retaining bonuses in 2010.
3   This level of compensation was available to 90 (5%) of the 61-year-olds working in com-
panies using bonuses as retention measures.
4   There are however some exceptions to this general rule, which affect, for example, employ-
ees in occupations with a special age limit and employees in companies with a defined 
contribution pension scheme, which consequently terminate employment contracts before 
the age of 70, typically at the age of 67.
5  The respondents were asked when they expected/were planning to retire.
